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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the change in the strength of strategic interaction from a policy 
introduction stage to a mature stage. The bulk of literature confirms the strategic 
interaction among local governments, but does not consider the change in the strength 
of strategic interaction. Our hypothesis is that the strength of strategic interaction 
decreases from a policy introduction stage to a mature stage because uncertainty at the 
policymaking stage might become weaker as time elapses. We focus on the Japanese 
long-term care insurance (LTCI) system that was introduced in fiscal year 2000. Our 
findings suggest that since municipalities should forecast the demand for long-term 
care and set the premium over a three-year “program management period,” they have a 
strong incentive to refer to the premium setting of surrounding municipalities. 
Moreover, the incentive would decrease as periods elapse. The empirical evidence is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the strength of strategic interaction on LTCI 
premium setting is gradually reduced from the early stage to the mature stage. 
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1. Introduction 
Much of the literature explores the existence of strategic interaction in which a policy 
decision, such as the setting of tax rate, expenditure level on local public services, and 
introducing a policy of a certain local jurisdiction, influences the policy decisions of 
other local jurisdictions. The strategic interaction can occur from the existence of 
“information spillover” in which the policy information of a local jurisdiction extends to 
neighboring jurisdictions and the residents can evaluate policies among the neighboring 
jurisdictions (Basely and Case, 1995). The policymakers (politicians) and officials would 
exert more effort in order to enhance their performance relative to their neighbors. 
Under this situation, the strategic interaction among neighboring jurisdictions would 
last for a long time1.  
Reveli (2006), however, explores the strategic interaction among neighboring 
jurisdiction changes. The study explores the change in the strength of strategic 
interaction in the UK’s local government expenditures on personal social services before 
and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system (Social Services 
Performance Rating, SSPR), which attributes a rating to each local authority. 
Introducing the SSPR reduced spatial interaction among local government expenditures 
by lessening information spillover among local governments. The study implies that 
local governments might not have the incentive to refer to neighboring jurisdictions, as 
Basely and Case (1995) and the following literature argued. Hayashi and Yamamoto 
(2016) found that Japanese municipalities (cities, towns, and villages) refer to the 
municipalities in the Fiscal Index Table for Similar Municipalities, which indexed a 
group of similar localities provided by the central government. The study also implies 
that the nationwide information disclosure would reduce the strategic interaction 
among neighboring jurisdictions.2 
Strategic interaction among neighboring jurisdictions might occur when local 
                                                  
1 Tiebout (1956) proposes another theory of interaction among local governments in 
which individuals move from one local community to another to maximize their 
personal utility. In our study, it is not appropriate because residents aged 65 years and 
above seldom move to other communities: their moving ratio is just 0.3 % (Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications, 2013). In addition, insured people moving to 
other municipalities to receive care in facilities remain insured by the municipality of 
their prior domicile in terms of the Japanese LTCI. 
2 There is a case in which the strategic interaction among neighboring jurisdictions 
decreases. Bivand and Szymanski (1997, 2000) find that the strength of strategic 
interaction of garbage collection service among local governments in the UK changed 
after the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) service. They point 
out that the reason for the weakening strength of strategic interaction among local 
governments was the decrease in the discretion of the local government’s garbage 
collection service by introducing CCT. 
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government authorities face the uncertainty of setting the “appropriate” policy level. 
Therefore, when the reference target is provided, the uncertainly of policymaking would 
decrease and the strategic interaction among neighboring jurisdictions also would 
decrease. This study aims to explore the change in the strength of the strategic 
interaction among local jurisdictions. If the strategic interaction among neighboring 
jurisdictions is due to the discipline effect of yardstick competition or the reelection 
motive of politicians, the effect would last for a long time. On the other hand, if the 
strategic interaction among neighboring jurisdictions is due to evading the uncertainty 
in the policy decision, the effect should decrease as the uncertainty decreases. The main 
objective of this study is to ascertain whether the strategic interaction among 
neighboring jurisdictions decreases or is constant from the policy introducing stage to 
the mature stage. If our hypothesis is appropriate, the incentive of the authority to refer 
to surrounding jurisdictions in the policy introduction stage should be high because the 
uncertainty of the policymaking is also high, and the incentive would decreased in the 
mature stage because the authority would acquire proficiency in policymaking. The 
change in the strength of strategic interaction from the policy introduction stage to the 
mature stage has not yet been examined. Therefore, in this study, we explore not only 
the existence of strategic interaction but also the change in the strength of the strategic 
interaction among local governments from the policy introduction stage to the mature 
stage in the case of long-term care insurance (LTCI) premium setting of Japanese 
municipalities.  
The Japanese LTCI system was introduced in the fiscal year (FY) 2000 and 
administered at the municipal level over a three-year “program management period” 
based on the pay-as-you-go principle.3 Municipalities are required to forecast the 
demand for long-term care of residents and revise premiums for residents aged 65 years 
and above in the next period. Therefore, in the LTCI system, municipalities face the risk 
of failure of premium setting due to the uncertainty of forecasting demand. We assume 
that the uncertainty and risk would strongly motivate municipalities to refer to the 
premium setting of the surrounding municipalities. Moreover, the incentive would 
decrease as the uncertainty and risk diminish. Thus, we also assume that the strength 
of strategic interaction for premium setting in the LTCI system would decrease from the 
introduction stage to the mature stage.  
We estimate a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances (SAC) 
to the LTCI premium setting of Japanese municipalities between the 1st program 
management period (FY 2000–2002) and the 5th program management period (FY 
                                                  
3 The Japanese fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31 in the following year. 
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2012–2014). The estimation results show that the point estimates of spatial lag 
coefficients of all periods are positive but decrease consecutively. We estimate using a 
generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) method on the same data to check 
the robustness. The estimation results support our assumption using the maximum 
likelihood (ML) method.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the LTCI 
system and premium setting in Japan. Section 3 presents the empirical method and the 
data used. Section 4 discusses the empirical results concerning the strength of the 
strategic interaction among municipalities on LTCI premium setting from the 
introduction stage to the mature stage. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Japanese LTCI system and premium setting 
2.1.  Japanese LTCI system 
Japan’s LTCI system was introduced in FY 2000 and administered at the municipal 
level over a three-year “program management period” based on the pay-as-you-go 
principle. Insurers have established special LTCI accounts for the purpose of 
administrating LTCI system. Campbell and Ikegami (2000) and Mitchell et al. (2004) 
emphasize that the linkage between benefit expenditure and premium burden as well 
as municipalities’ discretion in management are important innovations of Japan’s LTCI 
program. Residents aged 65 years and above (category I) and 40–64 years (category II) 
are insured under the LTCI scheme. When an insured individual needs long-term care, 
the Certification Committee for Long-term Care Needs of the municipality makes an 
eligibility assessment by evaluating the person’s physical and mental conditions 
necessitating care.  
Conditions requiring care range from mild to severe in a multistep approach. The 
degree of eligibility ranges across seven levels from “support care required I” (lowest 
level) to “long-term care required V” (highest level). The benefit is allocated on the basis 
of points and is limited by the degree of eligibility. For example, the benefit limits range 
from approximately 49,770 JPY (for support care required I) to 358,300 JPY (for 
long-term care required V) per month.4 When an eligible individual who has been 
considered eligible by the Certification Committee for Long-term Care Needs uses 
long-term care services, he/she should pay 10% of the care cost, while the LTCI would 
cover the remaining 90%.5  
                                                  
4 The data relate to the fifth program management period (FY 2012–2014). 
5 The insured individual can purchase additional services above the limit at his/her 
cost. 
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2.2. Financing of LTCI benefit and premium setting 
When the number of eligible individuals and the amount of benefits in a certain 
period increase, the municipality increases the next period’s premium to balance the 
budget. Surpluses, if any, are transferred to the Long-term Care Benefit Fund against 
future deficits. When fiscal resources for a certain program management period are 
insufficient because of increasing benefit or decreasing revenue (owing to, e.g., forecast 
error regarding increase in the number of eligible individuals or failure in premium 
setting), the municipality could draw down the Long-term Care Benefit Fund or borrow 
from the Fiscal Stabilization Fund. To repay the Fiscal Stabilization Fund loan, the 
municipality would need to increase the premium for the next program management 
period. Moreover, using the general budget to fund the municipality’s LTCI special 
account is prohibited by law, beyond its entitlement of 12.5% of the LTCI benefit. The 
LTCI benefit is financed by premium revenue from category I and II insured (50%), 
central and prefectural governments (37.5%), and municipal government (12.5%). 
The budget for each LTCI special account is required to be balanced on a three-year 
basis. The three-year period for budget planning is called the “program management 
period.” When a municipality frames its budget, it forecasts local LTCI expenditures for 
the full three years. The municipality forecasts the next period’s LTCI benefit based on 
recent results of the number of eligible individuals, number of applications for LTCI 
certification, and long-term care costs. Long-term care costs are divided into at-home 
care services and welfare facilities. 
After the benefits are forecast, revenues are considered. The revenues of an LTCI 
special account consist of (1) subsidies from upper-level governments (i.e., central and 
prefectural governments), (2) financial transfers from the municipal general account, 
(3) premiums directly paid by category I insured individuals within the municipality, 
and (4) distributed premiums from category II insured individuals via national health 
insurers. 
Categories I and II cover 50% of the LTCI expenditures. The premium setting of 
category II insured individuals is decided by the respective national health insurer 
based on their income. This premium is collected along with the health insurance 
premium. Therefore, the premium rate of category II is not under the municipality’s 
control. The Category I premium, on the other hand, is decided by each municipality 
based on the burden-bearing ability of the insured. The differential premium amount is 
set by each municipality according to the income level of the insured. In a typical case, 
an individual’s income is classified into six levels. Municipalities can discretionally 
decide the standard premium based on the distribution of the insured’s income and 
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forecasts of benefit expenditures. The standard premium is revised at the start of the 
program management period and fixed for the full three-year period. Figure 1 shows the 
total cost of the LTCI over the fiscal years, and Figure 2 shows the average standard 
premium per month for category I insured over the period. Those data are from Japan’s 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW).6 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
The figures show that both the total costs and standard premiums increase as aging 
rate and demand for long-term care increase. 
The MHLW explains that the standard premiums of municipalities are decided based 
on (1) the number of eligible individuals per category I insured,7 and (2) costs of 
long-term care services.8 Municipalities forecast the amount of demand for long-term 
care in the next management period based on these factors and set the premium for the 
category I insured individuals.  
As mentioned above, the Japanese LTCI is a structure for deciding the premium 
based on the demand forecasting in the next period. Authorities who want to avoid 
misforecasting have a strong incentive to refer to the premium setting of surrounding 
municipalities. Moreover, the incentive might be stronger at the introduction stage of 
the LTCI system because they need to perform unknown tasks and face high 
uncertainty of forecasting the demand for long-term care and premium setting. Hence, 
the strength of strategic interaction will decrease gradually as the period passes 
because the authority will acquire proficiency in the forecasting and decision-making 
procedure. On the other hand, if the strategic interaction among neighboring 
jurisdictions at the LTCI premium setting is due to the discipline effect of yardstick 
competition or reelection motive of politicians, the effect would be constant over the 
period. Therefore, we explore the hypothesis that the strength of strategic interaction of 
premium setting in the LTCI system decreases from the introduction stage to the 
mature stage. 
 
                                                  
6 http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/kaigo/zaisei/sikumi.html (in Japanese). 
7  Differences between municipalities’ ratios of elderly people requiring care and 
premium-bearing capacity are already adjusted to a nationwide mean value by the 
adjustment subsidy. 
8 Costs of long-term care services are divided between at-home care services and facility 
care services. 
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3. Empirical framework and data 
3.1.  Empirical method 
Using Japan’s cross-sectional municipal data, we estimate the following version of 
the SAC9: 
 
Y ൌ ߣWY ൅ Xߚ ൅ ݑ,  ݑ ൌ ߩMu ൅ ε,  (1) 
 
where Y ≡ ሾݕଵ, … , ݕேሿ  is a logged premium, X ≡ ሾݔଵ, … , ݔேሿ  with ݔ௜ ≡ ሾݔ௜,ଵ, … , ݔ௜,௞ሿ  are 
control variables, ݑ ≡ ሾݑଵ, … , ݑேሿ is a disturbance term, and ߝ ≡ ሾߝଵ, … , ߝேሿ is an i.i.d. 
normal distribution with constant standard deviation ߪ. 10 ߚ represents ܭ ൈ 1 vectors 
of slope parameters to be estimated. ߣ (strategic interaction) and ߩ (error interaction) 
are spatial lag parameters; in particular, ߣ is a spatial autoregressive parameter that 
measures the magnitude of strategic interaction across municipalities. 
W and M are row-normalized and non-stochastic ܰ ൈ ܰ spatial weights matrices11, 
and in our application, we assume W ൌ M for simplicity. W is designed to account for 
࢟ି࢏ chosen by other governments. M is designed to pick up the effect of any remaining 
unobserved spatial dependence that is difficult to be captured in the model. The spatial 
element ݓ௜,௝  in W  is equal to 1 ݀௜,௝⁄  with ݀௜,௝  being the distance between two 
municipalities ݅ and ݆	(݅ ് ݆) (e.g., Hanes, 2002; Solé-Ollé, 2006; Garrett et al., 2007; Yu 
et al., 2013).1213 In making such a specification, we assume that as the distance 
                                                  
9 The spatial lag is not a (spatial) time lag of other municipalities. Eq. (1) also excludes 
weighted values of other municipalities’ control variables (∑ ݓ௜,௝ݔ௜,௝௝ ), which are usually 
included in the spatial Durbin model. Our arguments are based on the Nash 
assumption in the theoretical models of fiscal competition in which the local 
government decides its fiscal variables ݕ௜ as an optimal response to given values of ࢟ି࢏, 
not to its control variables (Wildasin, 1988). 
10 Our estimator (the maximum likelihood estimator) produces consistent estimates in 
the i.i.d case but generally not in the heteroskedastic case; see Arraiz et al. (2010) for 
evidence that the ML estimator does not produce consistent estimates in the 
heteroskedastic case. 
11 In a row-normalized matrix, each row of W will sum to 1. 
12 Another commonly used spatial weight matrix is the contiguity-based binary matrix 
in which ݓ௜,௝ is set to 1 if municipalities ݅ and ݆	ሺ݅ ് ݆ሻ share a common border, and 0 
otherwise (e.g., Case, 1992; Hanes, 2002; Revelli, 2003; Baicker, 2005). The drawback of 
such a specification is that all neighboring municipalities are assumed to have equal 
influence and any spatial interactions between two non-neighboring municipalities are 
ignored. In our application, the omitted sample due to the numerous municipal 
amalgamations in Japan makes it difficult to construct the contiguity-based binary 
matrix. 
13 We assume that spatial weight elements that can be “relevant benchmarks” do not 
change because the distance between municipalities is invariant in our empirical data. 
We exclude municipalities related to amalgamation whose administrative scale might 
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between municipalities ݅  and ݆  increases, ݓ௜,௝  decreases, which poses less spatial 
weight to the pair ሺ݅, ݆ሻ and vice versa. In addition, our specification of W in the 
baseline model is restricted to the same prefecture. 	ݓ௜,௝  is positive when two 
municipalities ݅ and ݆ are in the same prefecture, and otherwise is 014. This setting of 
W must be appropriate because eligible individuals can freely use services beyond the 
pale of local administration in the Japanese LTCI system, and the strength of 
information spillover will depend on the distance among municipalities. W is defined 
as a prior and does not include parameters to be estimated. Equation (1) can be 
estimated with the maximum likelihood (ML) method. Detailed derivations of the 
log-likelihood function of equation (1) can be found in LeSage and Pace (2009) and 
Drukker et al. (2013b). 
The late stage elderly ratio (LSER), that is, the proportion of persons aged 75 years 
and above over those aged 65 years and above [= Population (Aged 75+) / Population 
(Aged 65+)] could affect the category I premium. The proportion captures the possibility 
of potential long-term care needs because those aged 75 years and above tend to need 
long-term care more than those aged 65 years and above.15 This index could have a 
positive effect on the premium; however, the national government, based on this index, 
provides the municipality with an adjustment subsidy so that the premium is not too 
different across municipalities, such that the index might have positive or no significant 
effect on the premium. 
 The eligibility ratio could also affect the premium. As discussed above, to be eligible 
for LTCI benefits, prospective recipients apply to have their needs assessed by their 
municipality of residence. There are seven stages of long-term care needs: support care 
required (SR) I and II, and long-term care required (CR) from I to V. We employ the 
following eligibility ratios: (1) Eligibility ratio [= Population (SR I-II + CR I-V) / 
Population (Aged 65+)], (2) Severe Eligibility ratio [= Population (CR IV-V) / Population 
(SR I-II + CR I-V)]. 
 Finally, the average cost of care services could also be important. We employ two 
                                                                                                                                                  
change. 
14 Fujimura (1999) indicates Japanese local municipalities use information on other 
municipalities in the same prefecture when devising a policy. In LTCI studies, 
Matsuoka (2016a; 2016b) use information criteria to show W restricted in the same 
prefecture best fits the date from among models with different spatial weights, such as 
the contiguity-based model and the fiscal index tables for similar municipalities covered 
by Hayashi and Yamamoto (2016).     
15 The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2004) reveals that the number of 
eligible individuals aged 75 years and above comprise 4.77 million and those aged 65 to 
74 years comprise 0.69 million. The eligibility ratio of those aged 75 years and above is 
approximately seven times more than the ratio of those aged 65 to 74 years.  
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average costs: (1) At-Home care (AHC) [= total cost of AHC / number of AHC recipients], 
(2) Facility care (FC) [= total cost of FC / number of NC recipients]. Both of them are 
logged control variables. 
 
3.2.  Data 
We estimate the abovementioned model using annual cross-sectional data of 2,549 
municipalities from FY 2000 to FY 2003 and of 1,514 municipalities from FY 2006 to FY 
2012.16 During FY 2003 to FY 2005, the number of municipalities was drastically 
reduced because of numerous municipal amalgamations driven by the national 
government. To consider this, it is necessary to verify our hypothesis in terms of not 
only the absolute value of parameter ߣ but also the tendency of the strength of ߣ 
throughout the periods. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for these variables. In the LTCI system, 
the national law requires municipalities to set premiums for category I insured 
individuals based on the forecasts for the three-year program management period. Thus, 
our data comprise every three-year period from FY 2000. 
 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
We extracted the data for municipal premiums and control variables from the Report 
on the LTCI Premium and Annual Report on the LTCI Programs, respectively, for the 
relevant years. Because the municipal data in FY 2000 are not available, we reviewed 
the municipal premiums in FY 2000, and used the control variables of FY 2001. To 
construct the spatial weights matrix based on inverse distance, we used data of the 
latitudes and longitudes of municipal office locations from the Geospatial Information 
Authority of Japan 2014 to calculate the distance between a given pair of 
municipalities.17 
 
4. Results 
4.1.  Main empirical results 
Table 2 provides the estimation results. The strategic interactions of dependent 
                                                  
16  This does not correspond to the total number of municipalities because some 
municipalities jointly manage the LTCI and they do not disclose the LTCI premium of 
the 1st program management period to the public.  
17 We used the STATA command “spmat idistance” developed by Drukker et al. (2013a) 
to calculate the distance using the latitudes and longitudes. 
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variable ߣ  from FY 2000 to FY 2012 are statistically significant and decrease in 
successive periods. We performed a likelihood ratio (LR) test for	ߣ ൌ 0 and ߩ ൌ 0, which 
are consistent with the above results.18  
These results reveal that the strategic interactions among municipalities are 
relatively high at the early stage of the LTCI program but they decrease. Except for 
LSER, other control variables are positive and statistically significant. Because the 
national government, based on this index, provides municipalities with adjustment 
subsidies to prevent premiums from not differing too much across municipalities, this 
subsidy could negatively affect the premiums. After controlling for the variables that 
could affect the setting of municipalities’ premiums, the strategic interactions are 
positive and gradually decrease as the period elapses. These results support our 
hypothesis. 
The change in the number of municipalities and weight matrices caused by a series 
of municipal amalgamations might affect the estimation results. However, the degree of 
the strength of ߣ shows the tendency to decline both in the pre-merger period (FY 
2000–2003) and the post-merger-period (FY 2006–2012). Therefore, the absolute value 
of ߣ might be affected by the amalgamations, but the tendency still holds after the 
amalgamations. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
4.2.  Robustness check 
Here, we check whether our estimates are consistent under heteroskedastic case 
using a different approach. Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 2010) suggest a three-step 
procedure known as generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS). We require 
an assumption that the error is i.i.d in ML because the ML estimator does not produce 
consistent estimates in the heteroskedastic case (Arraiz et al., 2010). The GS2SLS 
estimator produces consistent estimates in heteroskedastic case under the assumption 
that the control variables are indeed exogenously related to the dependent variable (e.g., 
Kelejian and Prucha 1998, 2010; Arraiz et al. 2010). Das et al. (2003) investigate the 
finite sample properties of estimators for GS2SLS and ML by using Monte Carlo 
simulations and find the GS2SLS estimator is virtually as efficient as the ML estimator. 
The procedure is as follows.  
                                                  
18 We used the LR test but not the Wald test in the ML estimation because the LR test 
results are more accurate than those of the Wald test if we follow ML estimation (Gould 
et al., 2010). 
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In the first step, the parameter vectors of ߚ and ߣ are estimated by 2SLS using the 
instrumental variables H	ሺX,WX,WଶXሻ . In the second step, we estimate the 
autoregressive parameter in the disturbance term ߩ by the general method of moments, 
using the residuals estimated in the first step. In the last step, using the estimates of 	ߩ 
to perform a spatial Cochrane-Orcutt transformation of the data, we estimate the 
efficient estimates of ߚ and ߣ.  
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of GS2SLS under the heteroskedastic case. 
The results of strategic interaction ߣ in GS2SLS are consistent with those of ML 
estimation. Instead of the LR test, we employ the Wald test for	ߣ ൌ 0 and ߩ ൌ 0, and the 
results of ߣ ൌ 0 are consistent with the LR test of the ML estimation. 
 We next consider spatial weights. The baseline model uses a restricted spatial 
weights matrix in which ݓ௜,௝is positive when two municipalities	݅ and ݆ are in the 
same prefecture, and otherwise is 0. We relax the assumption of the restriction of the 
same prefecture. In unrestricted spatial weights, all the elements are measured by the 
distance between two municipalities ݅  and ݆  and row-normalized. These weights 
assume municipalities refer to all the others. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
  The robustness checks for spatial weights estimated by ML and GS2SLS are reported 
in Table 4. The strategic interactions of dependent variable ߣ in ML and GS2SLS with 
unrestricted spatial weights decrease in successive periods. The results are consistent 
with the ones in the baseline result.  
 On the other hand, the absolute values of ߣ in the pre-merger period (FY 2000–2003) 
are quite high. When the coefficient value of strategic interaction in reaction functions 
are higher than 1, the model with the unrestricted spatial weights does not have a 
stable Nash equilibrium due to the divergence processes of the game.  
 We use information criteria to choose which spatial weights fit the date well 
(Leenders, 2002; Getis and Aldstadt, 2004; Hayashi and Yamamoto, 2016; Matsuoka, 
2016a; 2016b). Table 2 and Table 4 list the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). In terms of both criteria, the baseline results with 
the spatial weights restricted in the same prefecture in Table 2 fits the data better than 
the unrestricted ones in Table 4 owing to the smaller values of both the AIC and the 
12 
 
BIC. 
 Although the model with the unrestricted spatial weights is not appropriate 
compared to the restricted weights in the same prefecture, the tendency of decreasing 
strategic interactions still holds. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigated the change in the strength of strategic interaction from 
a policy introduction stage to the mature stage in the case of LTCI premium setting in 
Japanese municipalities. In the early stage of the LTCI program, authorities do not 
acquire proficiency in forecasting and would face uncertainty in premium setting. 
Owing to the information spillover of the LTCI premium and uncertainty of forecasting 
LTCI demand and premium setting, authorities would have the incentive to refer to the 
premium setting in the surrounding municipalities. Moreover, the strength of the 
incentive would be weaker at the introduction stage compared to the mature stage 
because the proficiency of forecasting would increase. 
We used the municipal data of standard premiums for a five-year period and 
estimated the SAC and weight matrices of the distance among municipalities in the 
same prefecture. The ML estimation results demonstrated that the parameter of 
strategic interaction is significantly positive in all the period but gradually decreases as 
the period elapses. We then employed the same data using an alternative GS2SLS 
method that incorporates heteroscedasticity; the GS2SLS estimation result also 
supports the result of ML estimation. We found that the strategic interaction does not 
always have the same strength but gradually changes.  
High strength of strategic interaction in a policy introduction stage captures an 
aspect of avoiding policy risks. Meanwhile, the policy result (e.g., LTCI premium 
setting) is not causes only from the characteristics of the municipalities. Therefore, the 
strategic interaction from avoiding uncertainty of introducing a new policy may lead to 
inefficiency. 
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Fig. 1. Total cost of LTCI over the fiscal years. 
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Fig. 2. Average standard premium per month over the period. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics. 
Variable Year(s) Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. 
Premium a 
 
(JPY) 
2000 2771.569 394.825 1533 4100 2549 
2003 3197.321 565.920 1783 5942 2549 
2006 3901.945 602.101 2200 6100 1514 
2009 4040.636 552.288 2265 5770 1514 
2012 4778.810 611.809 2800 6680 1514 
Pop (Aged75+) /  
Pop (Aged65+)b 
 
(%) 
2000 .450 .040 .313 .621 2549 
2003 .477 .048 .290 .649 2549 
2006 .492 .061 .293 .666 1514 
2009 .516 .070 .310 .718 1514 
2012 .531 .071 .339 .748 1514 
Eligibility ratiob 
 
(%) 
2000 .124 .027 .042 .289 2549 
2003 .148 .029 .080 .302 2549 
2006 .152 .027 .049 .371 1514 
2009 .161 .027 .089 .333 1514 
2012 .175 .029 .060 .283 1514 
Severe eligibility 
ratiob 
 
(%) 
2000 .269 .052 0 .514 2549 
2003 .258 .048 0 .500 2549 
2006 .256 .044 0 .442 1514 
2009 .263 .046 0 .714 1514 
2012 .251 .042 .111 .642 1514 
At-home care 
 (AHC)b 
 
(JPY) 
2000 29.163 4.673 10.785 83.413 2549 
2003 30.964 4.261 14.763 54.079 2549 
2006 34.426 4.527 7.758 93.152 1514 
2009 38.440 5.070 8.641 77.016 1514 
2012 39.618 5.572 7.792 89.507 1514 
Facility care 
 (FC)b 
 
(JPY) 
2000 301.648 20.804 142.200 386.728 2549 
2003 294.801 17.664 142.125 373.097 2549 
2006 246.029 12.362 196.283 301.015 1514 
2009 254.593 11.605 197.917 324.542 1514 
2012 251.955 12.429 90.095 319.132 1514 
Sources: a Ministry of Welfare and Labor, Kaigohokenryou [Report on the LTCI premium] 
(only FY 2000 surveyed by the authors); b Ministry of Welfare and Labor, Kaoigohoken jigyo 
hokokusyo [Annual Report on the LTCI Programs]. 
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Table 2. Estimation results (ML). 
 1st period 2nd period 3rd period 4th period 5th period 
 FY 2000 FY 2003 FY 2006 FY 2009 FY 2012 
Strategic interaction (ߣ) .689*** 
(.031) 
.550*** 
(.040) 
.413*** 
(.049) 
.237*** 
(.062) 
.196** 
(.083) 
Error interaction (ߩ) .462*** 
(.065) 
.596*** 
(.048) 
.326*** 
(.084) 
.440*** 
(.073) 
.549*** 
(.069) 
LSER -.273*** 
(.023) 
-.337*** 
(.024) 
-.387*** 
(.029) 
-.382*** 
(.023) 
-.384*** 
(.024) 
Eligibility ratio .789*** 
(.038) 
1.411*** 
(.044) 
1.426*** 
(.061) 
1.604*** 
(.060) 
1.416*** 
(.058) 
Severe eligibility ratio .040** 
(.016) 
.235*** 
(.022) 
.220*** 
(.031) 
.334*** 
(.026) 
.273*** 
(.029) 
At-home care .080*** 
(.011) 
.200*** 
(.016) 
.161*** 
(.021) 
.179*** 
(.019) 
.152*** 
(.018) 
Facility care .051** 
(.020) 
.028 
(.030) 
.304*** 
(.058) 
.316*** 
(.059) 
.223*** 
(.048) 
Log-likelihood 4820.652 4389.302 2572.168 2743.615 2720.788 
AIC -9623.305 -8760.604 -5126.337 -5469.231 -5423.576 
BIC -9570.714 -8708.013 -5078.434 -5421.328 -5375.674 
LR test (ߣ=0) 71.15*** 56.53*** 24.99*** 9.48*** 4.32** 
LR test (ߩ=0) 43.96*** 111.56*** 14.26*** 32.01*** 48.38*** 
LR test (ߣ=0,	ߩ=0) 1492.55*** 1160.93*** 269.29*** 188.08*** 236.09*** 
Sample size 2,549 1,514 
Notes: (i) *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. (ii) Standard errors are in parentheses. (iii) Spatial weights are based on 
inverse distance in the same prefecture. 
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Table 3. Estimation results (GS2SLS). 
 1st period 2nd period 3rd period 4th period 5th period 
 FY 2000 FY 2003 FY 2006 FY 2009 FY 2012 
Strategic interaction (ߣ) .742*** 
(.035) 
.602*** 
(.042) 
.473*** 
(.050) 
.235*** 
(.071) 
.173 
(.105) 
Error interaction (ߩ) .427*** 
(.084) 
.553*** 
(.056) 
.238*** 
(.093) 
.466*** 
(.075) 
.580*** 
(.074) 
LSER -.267*** 
(.027) 
-.335*** 
(.025) 
-.368*** 
(.029) 
-.380*** 
(.027) 
-.382*** 
(.031) 
Eligibility ratio .763*** 
(.051) 
1.393*** 
(.056) 
1.388*** 
(.089) 
1.605*** 
(.073) 
1.420*** 
(.070) 
Severe eligibility ratio .042** 
(.021) 
.236*** 
(.030) 
.219*** 
(.041) 
.333*** 
(.043) 
.275*** 
(.043) 
At-home care .079*** 
(.016) 
.198*** 
(.021) 
.161*** 
(.052) 
.180*** 
(.035) 
.154*** 
(.042) 
Facility care .049*** 
(.017) 
.025 
(.034) 
.295*** 
(.071) 
.318*** 
(.079) 
.228*** 
(.101) 
Wald test (ߣ=0) 431.20*** 198.66*** 88.13*** 10.98*** 2.69 
Wald test (ߩ=0) 25.83*** 96.12*** 6.57** 38.07*** 60.17*** 
Wald test (ߣ=0,	ߩ=0) 790.45*** 587.85*** 143.16*** 146.83*** 209.08*** 
Sample size 2,549 1,514 
Notes: (i) *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. (ii) Standard errors are in parentheses. (iii) Spatial weights based on inverse 
distance in the same prefecture. 
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Table 4. Robustness checks for spatial weights 
 1st period 2nd period 3rd period 4th period 5th period 
 FY 2000 FY 2003 FY 2006 FY 2009 FY 2012 
ML      
Strategic interaction (ߣ) 2.906*** 
(.088) 
1.763*** 
(.106) 
.390*** 
(.135) 
.093 
(.117) 
.187 
(.150) 
Error interaction (ߩ) 1.662*** 
(.037) 
2.036*** 
(.049) 
2.194*** 
(.101) 
2.345*** 
(.120) 
2.391*** 
(.109) 
Log-likelihood 4662.911 4286.384 2535.817 2723.205 2668.597 
AIC -9307.822 -8554.768 -5053.635 -5428.412 -5319.196 
BIC -9255.231 -8502.177 -5005.732 -5380.509 -5271.293 
GS2SLS      
Strategic interaction (ߣ) 1.477*** 
(.076) 
1.094*** 
(.056) 
.854*** 
(.236) 
.038 
(.355) 
.307 
 (.379) 
Error interaction (ߩ) 2.710*** 
(.208) 
3.219*** 
(.324) 
.978 
(.793) 
1.838*** 
(.602) 
1.077* 
(.621) 
Sample size 2,549 1,514 
Notes: (i) *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. (ii) Standard errors are in parentheses. (iii) Spatial weights are based on 
inverse distance. 
 
 
